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RECENT TREATIES
AND STATUTES
FOREIGN INVESTMENT-THE

CANADIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT
REVIEW ACT-AN ACT TO SCREEN FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA-ALLOWING THOSE INVESTMENTS OF SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO
CANADA

In response to growing anxiety over the growth of foreign direct
investment' in the Canadian economy and its possible adverse
effects on economic self-determination, the Canadian Senate, following the lead of the House of Commons, 2 enacted the Foreign
Investment Review Act (the Act) on December 13, 1973. 3 The Act
is intended to provide a mechanism of control over foreign investment, which has grown to great proportions since the end of World
War 11.1 Canada's fear of economic dominance by foreign interests
is not unfounded, especially since approximately one-third of the
total business activity in Canada is controlled by non-Canadian
enterprises, with the United States holding about 80 per cent of
this foreign control. 5 While members of the public and private
sectors recognize that extensive foreign investment has played a

1. For the purposes of this comment, foreign direct investment is investment
by foreign investors in the capital assets or shares of an enterprise with the
objective of establishing control or ownership. This contrasts with portfolio investment which is the purchase of securities for speculation or for the receipt of
dividends and interest.
2. The Foreign Investment Review Act was passed by the House of Commons
on November 26, 1973, without a dissenting vote. Upon passage of the Act by the
House, Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce reflected
the prevalent Canadian view toward foreign direct investment by stating, "Now
we're going to be more than a mere appendage of foreign corporate giants south
of the border." TIME, Dec. 17, 1973, at 100.
3. The law has two parts that will become effective at different times. The
first, covering the acquisitions of Canadian businesses by foreign entrepeneurs,
will be implemented in the spring of 1974, and the second, covering new investments and expansion of existing enterprises into new fields of activity, is expected
to be effective by the end of 1974. Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1973, at 21, col. 6.
4. "Between 1945 and 1967, the book value of United States long-term investment in Canada rose from just under $5 billion to $28 billion, with the direct
investment portion increasing from around $2 billion to $17 billion." FOREIGN
DIRECr INVESTMENT IN CANADA
5. GRAY REPORT 5.
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significant role in creating a high standard of living for the Canadian populace by aiding economic diversification, providing export
markets, introducing new competition and providing managerial
and technical expertise,' they nevertheless realize that foreign investment is not without drawbacks. Concomitant with extensive
foreign investment are such economic costs as long-term remittances of dividends and interest leading to possible balance of payments problems, unbalanced economic growth resulting from
foreign-based decision making, 7 and resource exploitation coupled
with social costs caused by the importation of cultural values related to foreign technology, business and employment practices.'
While maintaining that foreign investment is an integral part of
the Canadian economy, the Government felt that such investment
should be supervised to insure that the advantages of foreign investment inure to Canada and the Canadian economy.' For the
Government, the two principle problems caused by extensive foreign investment are the need to fulfill the objectives of Canadian
nationalism" and insure domestic control of investment policy. To
overcome these problems the Canadian Government enacted the
Foreign Investment Review Act establishing an agency" empowered to review foreign direct investment. This legislation will allow
6. Id. at 41.
7. J. WILLIAMSON, TAXATION OF U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CANADA 1-5 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMSON]. Exemplifying the problem of foreign-based
decision making is the practice of some Canadian subsidiaries of United States
corporations to forego trade opportunities with Communist China because of the
policies of the parent or because of pressure brought to bear on the parent by the
United States Government. Id. at 5. See generally GRAY REPORT 41-43.
8. GRAY REPORT 41-43. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON 5, 6; Newman, The Thawing of
Canada,9 ATLAN. COMMUNITY Q. 219, 223 (1971).
9. Foreign Investment Review Act § 2(1) [hereinafter cited as FIRA]; GRAY
REPORT 10-11.
10. Nationalism refers to an attitude characterized by a sense of national
consciousness. Such an attitude is prevalent in Canada, especially since many
Canadians wish to distinguish themselves from the United States and its culture,
both of which have played a significant role in Canada. See Wall Street J., Nov.
5, 1973, at 1, col. 4. The recent growth of economic nationalism is based on a
desire to protect Canadian resources and markets from foreign exploitation. See
note 20 infra and accompanying text.
11. Section 7(1) of the Act provides for the establishment of the Foreign Investment Review Agency [hereinafter called Agency] to advise and assist the
Minister, appointed from the Queen's Privy Council for Canada (the Cabinet),
in the administration of the Act.
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only those investments that are of significant benefit to Canada.
Foreign Investment Review Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c(1970), as
reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1136 (1973).
It is clear that the Canadian Government has the power to impose restrictions on foreign investments, for under the British
North America Act of 1867,12 the federal Parliament is vested with
exclusive legislative authority over "naturalization and aliens."
Such an exclusive grant of authority encompasses the realm of
foreign investment in the Canadian economy and the conditions
under which it is permitted. 13 Beginning in 1957, Candda reacted
to the growth of foreign investment in certain segments of the
economy by imposing restrictions on foreign participation in these
areas, e.g., banking, broadcasting, and insurance. 4 In 1963, to retard the further growth of foreign control, the Government sought
to limit the sale of Canadian enterprises to nonresidents through
a proposed 30 per cent turnover tax on such transfers." This turnover tax would have deterred foreign acquisitions by its prohibitive
burden, but the measure was withdrawn because of opposition
from the Canadian business community.' 6 Aware of the need for
greater Canadian participation in the economy, the Canadian
Government established the Canadian Development Corporation
(CDC) in 1971.' 7 This corporation is owned jointly by the Govern12. British North America Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 91(25) (Can.).
13. See Arnett, CanadianRegulation of ForeignInvestment: The Legal Parameters, 50 CAN. BAR. REV. 213, 214 (1972). The British North America Act of 1867
represents one of the initial grants of constitutional jurisdiction to the Canadian
Parliament. Included in this grant of jurisdiction over naturalization and aliens
is the power to restrict foreign investment in Canada, which is, in effect, a restriction on the rights of "aliens." Id.
14. Limitations on foreign shareholdings in Canada apply to banks, broadcasting stations, and federally incorporated life insurance, trust, loan and sales
finance corporations. See generally Arnold, Restrictionson ForeignInvestment In
CanadianFinancialInstitutions, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 196 (1970). The legislation
generally restricts the transfer or issue of corporation shares, in excess of specified
percentages, to nonresidents. E.g., Bank Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. B-1, §§ 53-54
(1970); Canadian & British Insurance Companies Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 1-16,
§§ 19, 20 (1970); Trust Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. T-16, §§ 38-39 (1970).
15. Arnold, supra note 14, at 203-04.
16. Id. at 204.
17. The Canadian Development Corporation was founded and funded by the
Canadian Government to operate as an autonomous company combining the
public and private sectors of the economy. While the CDC was initially owned
Vol. 7-No. 3
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ment and private investors for the purpose of developing Canadian
industry and resources, expanding Canadian investment participation, and providing capital for entrepeneurial activities and investments deemed beneficial to the Canadian economy.'8 The CDC

is a counterbalance to foreign control that embraces the long-term
goal of repatriating decision making power in the Canadian economy.' 9 This disjointed framework of piecemeal measures, aimed at
stemming the tide of greater foreign control, coupled with the recent growth of economic nationalism, 0 provided the impetus for

the Foreign Investment Review Act. It was apparent that a uniform approach covering all segments of the economy was required

to deal effectively with the influx of foreign investment.' While
generally dealing with the broad spectrum of foreign direct investment, the Act specifically provides a system for reviewing the investment decisions of foreign-based (mostly United States) multinational enterprises (MNE)2 that affect the Canadian economy.
by the Government, the Government's interest is to decrease to approximately
ten per cent over a period of years. The extensive capital obtained from both
government and private subscriptions will be available for investment in the
Canadian economy (where it is deemed profitable to do so). R. Couzin, The
CanadianDevelopment Corporation:A ComparativeApproach, 17 McGILL L.J.
405 (1971).
18. Id. at 415.
19. Id. at 414.
20. Canada's crude oil export tax for the first time has created a two price
system whereby Canadians pay less for domestic crude oil than Americans do for
imported oil. Also, in November 1973, Canada placed an import tax on cattle,
most of which come from the United States. This is further evidence of Canada's
desire to regulate foreign influence in her economy. Wall Street J., Nov. 23, 1973,
at 6, col. 4. Moreover, the Foreign Investment Review Act has been attacked by
economic nationalists, such as the Committee for an Independent Canada, who
believe that foreign investment is detrimental to their country and want more
stringent restrictions-the Committee includes twenty members of the Canadian
Parliament. Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1973, at 21, col. 1.
21. The problems of extensive foreign investment are myriad: possible balance of payments problems precipitated by a large outflow of interest income and
dividends, the effect of large capital inflows on the exchange value of the currency
and the resultant dislocation of buying power on the world market, and the fear
of the detrimental effect on the Canadian economy of foreign-based decision
making. WILLIAMSON 1-5.
22. The multinational enterprise has been the subject of concern in Canada
because of the MNE's vast resources and flexibility. The MNE with extensive
holdings throughout the world can afford to restrict production, shift resources
Summer, 1974
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Such review should help resolve the policy conflict between the
MNE, which often emphasizes extractive industries, and the Canadian Government, which desires to establish a more balanced
economy.2 The Act controls foreign investment by establishing a
Foreign Investment Review Agency with authority to review the
desirability of proposed investments by non-eligible persons24 and
to make recommendations to the Cabinet.? To determine whether
an investment is of significant benefit to Canada, the following
factors will be considered: (1) the effect of the acquisition or establishment of a new business on the economic activity of Canada; (2)
the degree and significance of Canadian participation in the enterprise; (3) the effect of the acquisition or establishment of a new
business on productivity, technological development, product
innovation, and product variety; (4) the effect on competition; and
(5) the compatibility of the investment with national economic
policies .2 1 The Agency applies these criteria in the review of transactions by non-eligible persons that consist of the acquisition of
Canadian enterprises, 27 the establishment of new businesses,2 and
the expansion of established businesses into unrelated fields. 2 For
the purposes of the Act, control of a Canadian business may be
acquired only through the acquisition of shares or assets of the
or totally withdraw from countries that are judged to be politically or economically unsuitable. GRAY REPORT 54-57; K. LEvrrT, SILENT SURRENDER: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN CANADA 9 (1970). Also, the MNE might defer certain
operations in Canada in favor of exploiting investments in more unstable environments. Brecher, The Flow of United States Investment Funds in CanadaSince
World War Two, in THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON CANADA 108 (H. Aitken
ed. 1959).
23.

GRAY REPORT

6.

24. A "non-eligible person" means: (a) an individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a landed immigrant, (b) a foreign government or government
agency, (c) a corporation that is controlled in any manner that results in control
in fact by persons deemed non-eligible in a and b supra. FIRA § 3(1). Further, a
corporation is presumed to be non-eligible if 25% or more of the voting stock of a
public corporation or 40% of the stock of a close corporation is held by nonCanadians, or if more than 20% of the directors or managers are non-Canadian.

FIRA § 3(2).
25.
26.
27.
28.

FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA

§§ 9, 10.
§ 2(2)a-e.
§§ 2(1), 5(1).
§§ 2(1), 6.

29. FIRA § 2(1).
Vol. 7-No. 3
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business.30 Shares held by security dealers3 ' and shares acquired by
persons providing venture capital" are specifically exempted from
the Agency's scope of review. Further, the Agency must review all
proposed acquisitions by non-eligible persons of enterprises with
gross assets in excess of 250,000 dollars and annual gross revenues
of 3,000,000 dollars.3 Unless these gross revenue and assets guidelines exempt the proposal, the review process commences when a
non-eligible investor submits to the Agency a proposal to acquire
stock or assets of a Canadian enterprise. To determine whether
such an investment will result in control of a Canadian enterprise
by non-eligible persons and, therefore, require fuller Agency review, the Act creates three presumptions that help define control
through the acquisition of shares of a corporation. First, control is
conclusively presumed if a non-eligible investor holds more than
50 per cent of the voting stock of the corporation.3 1 Secondly, when
a non-eligible person holds more than five per cent of the voting
shares of a public corporation or more than twenty per cent of the
shares of a close corporation, there is a rebuttable presumption of
control.3 5 Thirdly, if there is less than the specified five or twenty
per cent ownership, lack of control will be presumed. 3 Further,
proposals by non-eligible persons to establish new businesses or to
expand established businesses into unrelated fields are subject to
approval by the Minister" in accordance with such guidelines as
he may promulgate. 8 To insure that the review process is not
impeded by bureaucratic inertia or dilatory tactics, 0 the Act provides that if a ruling on a proposed investment is not received
within 60 days of its submission, the proposal will be deemed allowed. 0 Although the Foreign Investment Review Agency and the
30. FIRA § 3(3)i(A-B).

31. FIRA § 3(3)b(ii).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA

§ 3(3)b(iii).
§ 5(1)c(i-ii).
§ 3(3)d.
§ 3(3)c(i-ii).
§ 3(3)b(i)A-B.
§ 10.

38. FIRA § 4(2).
39. Notes for Remarks by Alastair Gillespie, Minister of Industry, Trade &
Commerce, to the House of Commons Standing Committee On Finance, Trade
And Economic Affairs, at 6 [hereinafter cited as Notes].
40. FIRA § 13(1).
Summer, 1974
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Minister are given extensive powers to demand information about
proposed investments,4 ' any information furnished will be considered confidential to insure the protection of business plans and
trade secrets. 2 Finally, if the Minister has reasonable grounds to
believe that the review process is being circumvented, he is
empowered to investigate the records of suspected violators 3 and
to seek appropriate sanctions for violations of the Act. Persons
attempting to circumvent the Act may be enjoined from making
the investment," or may be fined up to five thousand dollars 5 on
summary conviction. Also, any person who fails to comlly with the
Minister's demand for notice of proposed investments may be subjected to a fine of up to ten thousand dollars, or to imprisonment
of up to six months, or both. 6
It appears that the foreign investment screening process implemented by the Act should prove to be an effective method for
dealing with the two major problem areas resulting from foreign
direct investment, i.e. Canadian nationalism and domestic control
over foreign investment. The Act should fulfill the objectives of
Canadian nationalism by granting the Government broad powers
to supervise foreign interests desiring to invest in Canadian enterprises. Instead of permitting unlimited foreign investment, the
Canadian Government will be operating from a position of strength
and will no longer simply acquiesce to the foreign investor's terms.
Such power should both increase Canadian esteem for the Government and its authority and alter the image of the Canadian economy as an extension of United States business activity.4 7 Besides
fulfilling nationalistic objectives, the review mechanism should
provide the Canadian Government with a useful tool for dealing
with foreign investors, especially MNE's. Since the Government
has the power to authorize or reject proposed investments, it can
bargain for better terms from foreign interests desirous of locating
41. FIRA § 11. The type and extent of information that must be contained
in an investment proposal has not been determined, but such requirements will
be prescribed under the Minister's authority to promulgate regulations and guidelines.
42. FIRA § 14(1). Notes 7.
43. FIRA § 16(1-2).
44. FIRA § 19(1).

45. FIRA § 24(1).
46.
47.

FIRA § 24(2).
See note 2 supra.
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in Canada. The Minister and Cabinet in determining whether to
permit foreign investments, will consider the extent of research
and development to be performed by foreign corporations within
Canada, the projected participation by Canadian investors in foreign controlled enterprises, and the Canadian involvement in the
corporate decision making processes." Because of the Act's extensive coverage and flexibility in the adoption of necessary guidelines
and regulations, the Government will be better equipped to direct
future foreign investment into areas that will provide the greatest
benefit to the Canadian economy. The Government is vested with
further control over investment policy because of the manner in
which the Act complements the operation of the Canadian Development Corporation. On the one hand, the Foreign Investment
Review Act will provide regulation of future foreign investment in
the economy by allowing the Government to foster investments in
underdeveloped provinces and embryonic industries and to retard
growth in areas that may be overdeveloped. On the other hand, the
CDC may utilize its extensive capital resources to increase Canadian participation and control in established foreign-directed enterprises that are outside the purview of the Act.4" There are, however, two possible shortcomings of the Act. First, the Act's presumptions of control, based on the percentage ownership of stock,
may not be broad enough." Such a standard does not take into
account the fact that control may be exercised through informal
agreements, franchises, patent rights, licensing of know-how, market arrangements, or financial commitments. However, control
exercised by a non-eligible person through management or licensing agreements, constituting control in fact, taints the controlled
corporation with non-eligible status. 1 Thus, the business will be
48. Historically, foreign firms have not carried on research and development

in Canada, preferring to develope technology at home for licensing abroad. GRAY
REPORT

6. Similarly, some United States corporations have refused to make stock

of their Canadian subsidiaries available to Canadian investors. WILLIAMSON 5, 6.
These practices have caused Canadians great concern, and the Foreign Invest-

ment Review Act is intended to ameliorate these problems.
49. A recent example of the CDC's role is its acquisition of 30% of the shares

of Texasgulf, Inc., a United States corporation with extensive holdings in Canada.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1974, § 3 (Finance), at 7, col. 1.
50. Note, ForeignInvestment Restrictions: Defending Economic Sovereignty

in Canada and Australia, 14 HNARv. INT'L L.J. 345, 358 (1973).
51. See note 24 supra.
Summer, 1974
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subject to the review process should it desire to expand into an
unrelated field or acquire control of a Canadian enterprise
throught the purchase of stock. Secondly, there is concern that the
passage of the Act will evoke retaliatory measures from other nations, especially the United States. Retaliation is unlikely since
Canada is not the first United States trading partner to adopt
restrictive controls over foreign investment. 2 Also, the recent rise
of foreign direct investment in the United States has made many
leaders in business and government aware of Canada's similar concern over the control of domestic enterprises by foreign interests.
In conclusion, it appears that Canada should benefit both in an
economic and nationalistic sense through the implementation of
the Foreign Investment Review Act. Greater control over foreign
direct investment should strengthen Canadian economic policy
and enhance economic self-determination. In addition, Canada's
sovereign acts in regulating the terms for foreign involvement in
the Canadian economy will increase Canadian self-esteem.
Charles H. Manning

52. France and Mexico have enacted comparable measures with impunity.
See, e.g., de Marsac & Rich, Direct Investment In France: Law And Taxes, 5
VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 361 (1972); Note, "PobreMexico, Tan Lejos de Dios y Tan

Cercade Los Estados Unidos" Mexican ForeignInvestment Regulation,1972 LAw
& Soc. ORDaR 280.
Vol. 7-No. 3
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS-CARIBBEAN COMMON MARKET-CARIBBEAN

COUNTRIES

BAND TOGETHER

TO

PROMOTE

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND ACHIEVE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The desire to expand Caribbean regional economic integration
and functional cooperation and to implement a policy of regional
self-help motivated the recent establishment of a Caribbean Community and Common Market.' The launching of a West Indies
Federation in 1958, however, was the first attempt at economic
integration in the Caribbean.2 Five years after the Federation's
collapse 3 in 1962, eleven Caribbean states formed the Caribbean
Free Trade Association 4 (CARIFTA), which basically provided a
plan for free trade among the Member Territories by removing
intrastate tariffs. The immediate, parochial objective of CARIFTA
was to expand free trade in the region through an internal tariff
1. Treaty Establishing The Caribbean Community, Port of Spain, July 4,
1973. The following states are signatories: Antiqua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Neville-Anguilla,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. Bahamas, Belize, and Grenada
are expected to accede to the Treaty by May 1, 1974.
2. The West Indies Federation, formed in 1958 under the auspices of the
United Kingdom, embraced Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Antigua,
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Neville-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Montserrat, and British Guiana.
3. Many analyses of the breakdown of the West Indies Federation have
pointed out several distinct weaknesses on the face of the arrangement. First, the
establishment of the Federation was the idea of the British, not the West Indian
countries themselves. This factor may have accounted for the lack of enthusiasm
on the part of the West Indian peoples and their governments for Caribbean
regionalism. Secondly, the structure of the Federation was too loosely coordinated
and too weighted in favor of the British to foster trade expansion and regional
cooperation. The operational framework of the Federation failed to provide such
basic economic devices as a common tariff, a common currency, a common postal
system and federal taxes. Throughout the life of the Federation the British retained control over foreign policy, defense, finances, and constitutional amendment. For a discussion of the operation and collapse of the West Indies Federation, see H. CORKRAN, PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
CARIBBEAN, 1942-1969 (1969); G. LEWIS, THE GROWTH OF THE MODERN WEST INDIES
(1968); J. MORDECAI, THE WEST INDIES (1968).
4. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, April 30,
1968 [hereinafter called CARIFTA]. The Association had eleven Member Territories: Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat,
St. Kitts-Neville-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago. 7 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 935 (1968).
Summer, 1974
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abolition plan,' which removed tariffs from goods produced by
Member States and traded within the territory.' The CARIFTA
provisions for trade liberalization were the entire substance of this
scheme for economic integration and regional development. Other
dimensions of regional cooperation such as a common external
tariff, integrated use of resources, a special plan for the less developed countries, 7 or the possibility of allocating new industries to
underdeveloped member countries8 were not included. Since this
approach was deficient and since there are vastly disparate levels
of economic, industrial and agricultural development among the
Member States,9 the Caribbean States ' " expanded the economic
integration plan of CARIFTA and entered into the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, which exceeds CARIFTA's
scope by establishing a common external tariff for all commodities
imported from non-Member nations, a special regime for the Less
Developed Countries," an extensive plan for the coordination of
5. The broadly stated objectives of CARIFTA are: "(a) to promote the expansion and diversification of trade in the area of the Association, (b) to secure that
trade between Member Territories takes place in conditions of fair competition,
(c) to encourage the balanced and progressive development of the economies of
the Area . . .(d) to foster the harmonious development of the Caribbean trade
and its liberalisation by the removal of barriers to it, [and] (e) to ensure that
the benefits of free trade are equitably distributed among the Member Territories." CARIFTA, art. 2(1).
6. CARIFTA, arts. 3-19.
7. CARIFTA, art. 39.
8. The "less developed states" are those Caribbean countries including Antigua, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-NevilleAnguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, which have a level of economic, industrial,
technological, and agricultural development far below that of the more developed
Caribbean states of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. For
a discussion of the present agricultural and industrial development of Caribbean
countries, see U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE,
AGRICULTURE AND TRADE OF THE CARIBBEAN REGION

(1971).

9. Preamble to Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association.
10. Belize, Bahamas, and Grenada were not original Member Territories of
CARIFTA, but subsequently joined as original Member States in the Treaty
Establishing the Caribbean Community.
II. Article 3 of the Treaty provides that Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago shall be designated "More Developed Countries," and that
Antigua, Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-NevilleAnguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent shall be designated "Less Developed Countries" for purposes of the Treaty.
Vol. 7-No. 3
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economic policies, development planning among the Member
States, and a trade liberalization plan. 2 Treaty Establishing The
CaribbeanCommunity, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 1973,
12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1033 (1973).

The Treaty establishes a Caribbean Community, the essential
feature of which is a Caribbean Common Market, which is intended to regulate, strengthen, and enhance the commercial, economic, industrial and social development of the Member States. 3
The principal objectives of the Community include: (1) the economic integration of the Member States by the establishment of a
common market regime, (2) the strengthening and coordinating of
economic and trade relations among the Member States, (3) the
coordination of the foreign policies of Member States, and (4) functional cooperation. 4 To achieve these objectives, the Treaty provides an administrative apparatus and an institutional framework
for the Community and the Common Market. The major executive
organ of the Community is the Conference of Heads of Government, 1' which has primary responsibility to determine the policy
of the Community. 6 The principal organ of the Common Market
is the Common Market Council,17 charged with supervising and
managing the Common Market, and settling problems and disputes arising from its functioning. 8 The remaining bodies of the
12. The signing of the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community dissolves the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).
13. Preamble to Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community.
14. Article 4. Functional cooperation is one of the primary objectives of the
Community. Under article 4(c), the plan centering around functional cooperation
envisions the efficient operation of certain common services and activities for the
promotion of greater understanding among its peoples and the advancement of
their social, cultural and technological development. Article 4(c) (i)-(ii).
15. Arts. 6(1), 7. This Conference is composed of the heads of government of
the Member States.
16. Article 8(1). It is also the function of the Conference to establish institutions for the Community and to issue policy directions for these Institutions and
the Common Market Council.
17. Article 5(1), Annex.
18. The Common Market Council is also responsible for reviewing the Annex
with a view toward making proposals to the Conference for the progressive development of the Common Market. It also considers alleged breaches of any obligations arising under the Annex. Further, it considers what action should be taken
by Member States and the Common Market and makes proposals to the Conference to facilitate the establishment of closer economic and commercial links with
other states or international organizations. Article 7 (1) (c), (d), Annex.
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Community consist of seven Institutions,' 9 ten Associated Institutions,' " and the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat. 2'
The articles that detail the operational framework of the Common
Market form the bulk of the Treaty. Articles 13 through 30 of the
Annex to the Treaty outline the trade liberalization policy. Goods
that are classified as being of Common Market origin are eligible
for Common Market treatment. 22 The Treaty provides that goods
shall be treated as being of "Common Market origin" if they are
consigned from one Member State to another and comply with any24
23
one of three listed conditions. Such goods cannot have import
19. Article 10. The Institutions of the Community are composed of the Conference of Ministers responsible for Health, the Standing Committee of Ministers
responsible for Education, the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for
Labour, the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, the
Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Finance, the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Agriculture, and the Standing Committee of Ministers responsible for Mines.
20. Article 14. The Associate Institutions of the Community include: the Caribbean Development Bank, the Caribbean Investment Corporation, the West
Indies Associated State Council of Ministers, the Caribbean Examinations Council, the Council of Legal Education, the University of the West Indies, the University of Guyana, the Caribbean Meteorological Council and the Regional Shipping
Council.
21. Article 15(1). The Secretariat is the principal administrative organ of the
Community. The duties of the Secretariat include: (1) to service meetings of the
Community and any of its Institutions or Committees as may be determined by
the Conference, (2) to take appropriate implementing action on decisions made
at such meetings, (3) to initiate, arrange, and carry out studies on questions of
economic and functional cooperation relating to the region as a whole, (4) to
provide services to Member States at their request in respect of matters relating
to the achievement of the objectives of the Community, and (5) to undertake any
other duties that may be assigned to it by the Conference or any other of the
Institutions of the Community. Article 16(1) (a)-(e).
22. Article 14, Annex.
23. Article 14, Annex. The conditions listed in article 14 require that the goods
must either: (a) have been wholly produced within the Common Market; (b) fall
within a description of goods listed in a process list to be established by the
decision of Council and have been produced within the Common Market by the
appropriate qualifying process described in that list, or (c) have been produced
within the Common Market. Also, the value of any materials imported from
outside the Common Market or from undetermined sources, which have been
used at any stage of the production of the goods, may not exceed: (i) in a Less
Developed Member Country 60 % of the export price of the goods, or (ii) in any
Member State 50% of the export price of the goods. Article 14 (1), Annex.
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or export" duties or any quantitative import" or export" restrictions applied to them by Member States. The Treaty, however,
does permit each Member State to refuse to treat goods that benefit from export drawback as having a Common Market origin."Goods of Common Market origin receive favorable treatment with
respect to revenue duties and other internal fiscal charges;2" for
example, Member States shall not apply any fiscal charges" to
goods of Common Market origin in excess of those applied to like
domestic goods. Further, Member States cannot apply fiscal
charges to imported goods that they do not produce or that they
produce in small quantities.3 To complete the trade liberalization
plan, the Treaty includes specific provisions that advance the
objectives of the Common Market 2 yet allow for general and spe24. "Import duties" means "any tax or surtax of customs and any other
charges of equivalent effect whether fiscal, monetary, or exchange, which are
levied on imports except duties notified under Article 17 . . ." Article 15 (3),
Annex.
25. For purposes of the Treaty, "export duties" means "any duties or charges
with equivalent effect imposed on or in connection with the exportation of goods
from any Member State to a cosignee in any other Member State." Article 18 (3),
Annex.
26. Under article 21 (3) of the Annex, "quantitative restrictions" means "prohibitions or restrictions on imports into, or exports from, any Member State as
the case may be, whether made effective through quotas, import licenses or other
measures with equivalent effect, including administrative measures and requirements restricting imports or exports."
27. Article 22 (1), Annex.
28. For the purposes of article 16 of the Annex, "export drawback" is "any
arrangement for the refund or remission, wholly or in part of import duties applicable to imported materials, provided that the arrangement, expressly or in effect,
allows refund or remission if certain goods or materials are exported, but not if
they are retained for home use." Article 16 (2) (a), Annex.
29. Article 17, Annex.
30. "Fiscal charges" are defined as "revenue duties, internal taxes, and other
internal charges on goods." Article 17 (3) (a), Annex.
31. Article 17 (1) (b), Annex.
32. See articles 25, 26, 27, and 35, Annex. Under article 30 of the Annex,
Member States agree to refrain from participating in various kinds of restrictive
business practices that operate to frustrate the benefits expected from the functioning of the Common Market. Two practices that are prohibited under this
article are (1) agreements between enterprises that have as their object or result,
the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the Common Market; and (2) actions by which one or more enterprises take unfair advantage of a
dominant position within the Common Market. Article 30 (1) (a) and (b), Annex.
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cific exceptions to the provisions of the Treaty.33 Articles 31
through 34 set out the Common Protective Policy of the Common
Market and establish a common external tariff on all goods imported from third countries. 3 The Common Market Council, by
unanimous vote, may alter or suspend any item of the Common
External Tariff.3 5 A Member State during the transitional period,3 6
however, may deviate from the common tariff with respect to a
specific item for domestic price control purposes 37 or for other listed
reasons.3 To enhance the trade liberalization plan operating the
common external tariff, the Member States have outlined several
measures for coordinating economic policies and development
planning; Member States generally pledge themselves to coordinate their economic policies, 39 to harmonize fiscal incentives, 0 to
harmonize their laws, 4' to work jointly in the formulation of a
Common Market Perspective Plan and to consult among themselves when formulating operational development plans.4 2 In addition, Member States agree to work toward common objectives in
33. See articles 23, 24, and 29, Annex. Article 28 authorizes a Member State
to introduce quantitative restrictions on imports for the purpose of safeguarding
its balance of payments. Article 28 (1), Annex.
34. Article 31 (1) establishes that the Common External Tariff will be applied
in accordance with a plan and schedule to be adopted by the Conference of Heads
of Government.
35. Article 32 (1), Annex.
36. The transitional period is from the date of entry into force of the Treaty
until August 1, 1981.
37. Goods originating from Member States on which duties are payable may
be accorded treatment no less favorable. Article 32(2), Annex.
38. See articles 32(3) and 33(1), Annex.
39. Member States agree to coordinate their economic policies, their statistical services in matters directly related to the operation of the Common Market,
and their positions at all international economic and trade meetings attended.
Article 39, Annex.
40. Article 40(1), (2), Annex. Member States also pledge themselves to establish plans for the harmonization of fiscal incentives for agriculture and tourism
with favorable differentials to the Less Developed Countries. Article 40(2),
Annex.
41. Member States seek to harmonize their laws as they affect the functioning
of the Common Market in the following areas: companies, trademarks, patents,
designs and copyrights, industrial standards, marks of origin, labeling of food and
drugs, plant and animal quarantine restrictions, restrictive business practices,
and dumping and subsidization of exports. Article 42, Annex.
42. Article 45(1)-(2), Annex.
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promoting industrial development,43 to negotiate and formulate
projects for the joint development of natural resources,44 and to
adopt a scheme for the rationalization of agricultural production
within the Common Market. 5 Lastly, Member States were cognizant of the special needs of the less developed Member States,"
and provided for a Special Regime for Less Developed Countries.
The Regime provides a flexible operational structure in which the
less developed members participate in the operation of the Common Market. The special needs of these members are to be taken
into account in compiling the process list that defines goods of
Common Market origin,4" in establishing a scheme for harmonization of fiscal industrial incentives,48 and in establishing a scheme
for a Common External Tariff. 9 A less developed Member State
also may temporarily suspend Common Market treatment on imports of Common Market origin" or impose quantitative restrictions on imports from other Member States.5 More Developed
43. Article 46(1), Annex. Industrial development programming under the
Treaty will concentrate on achieving the following objectives: the greater utilization of the raw materials of the Common Market, the creation of production"
linkages both within and between the national economies of the Common Market,
the encouragement of greater efficiency in industrial production, and the promotion of exports to markets both inside and outside the Common Market. Article
46(I) (a), (b), (d)and (e).
44. Article 47 (1)-(2), Annex.
45. Article 49, Annex. The objectives of the proposed scheme include the
development of a regional plan for the integration of agricultural development in
the Common Market; the improvement of the efficiency of agricultural production to increase the supply of agricultural products; the replacement of imports
on a regional basis; and increasing the income and standard of living of the rural
population. Article 46 (2) (a)-(e), Annex.
46. See note 8 supra.
47. Article 53, Annex.
48. Article 54, Annex.
49. Article 55, Annex.
50. As a temporary measure to promote the development of an industry in the
Less Developed States, the Common Market Council, upon application, may
authorize a Less Developed State to suspend Common Market treatment of any
description of imports eligible therefore on grounds of production in the other
Member States. Article 56(1), Annex.
51. As a temporary measure to promote the development of an industry in the
Less Developed States, the Common Market Council, upon application, may
authorize such States to impose quantitative restrictions on like imports from
other Member States. Article 56(2), Annex.
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Member States further agree to cooperate in providing financial
assistance,5 2 technology and research facilities to the Less Developed Member States. 53 The final articles of the Treaty establish
legal capacity, 4 accession,55 amendgeneral rules that govern
5 " and withdrawal. 57
ment,
The creation of a Caribbean Community and Common Market
marks the most elaborate effort undertaken by the Eastern and
Western Caribbean nations to achieve substantial economic integration. The scheme embraced in the Treaty, aimed at promoting
regional cooperation and achieving economic integration, is
equipped with internal commitments and dynamics absent in the
CARIFTA Agreement yet necessary to achieve the goal of economic integration. While the CARIFTA plan for regional cooperation sought to reach its ends solely through trade barrier liberalization without providing substantial favorable differentials to the
Less Developed Countries, the Treaty establishing the Caribbean
Community and Caribbean Common Market adopts a multidimensional approach to enhance regional cooperation and achieve
economic integration. As a result, this Treaty is more likely to
achieve its ends than the previous attempts at economic integration for several reasons. First, the Treaty establishes a Common
External Tariff on all imports, which is an essential protective
measure for economic development. Secondly, Member States
recognize that they are at vastly different levels of industrial and
agricultural development; consequently the Treaty encompasses a
52. Article 59(1), Annex. To promote the flow of investment capital to the
Less Developed Countries, the More Developed Countries agree to cooperate in
facilitating joint ventures in those states, negotiating double taxation agreements
in respect of the income from investments in the Less Developed Countries by
residents of other Member States, and facilitating the flow of loan capital to the
Less Developed Countries. Article 59(1) (a)-(c), Annex.
53. Article 60, Annex.
54. The Treaty provides that the Common Market shall have international
juridical capacity. Article 63(1), Annex.
55. Article 65, Annex.
56. Article 66, Annex.
57. Article 69, Annex.
58. For a discussion of the importance and effect of common tariffs and other
protective measures on Caribbean economies see W. DEMAS, THE ECONOMICS OF
DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL COUNTRIES WITH SPECIAL REFERRENCE TO THE CARIBBEAN

(1965).
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thorough plan favoring the Less Developed Countries to enable
them to share more equitably in the benefits of regional economic
cooperation. 9 Thirdly, while the previous schemes of regional cooperation virtually ignored the possibility of integrating the use of
resources, the Treaty affirmatively calls for the joint development
of natural resources and for the formulation of a plan to integrate
agricultural development in the Common Market. Fourthly, the
Treaty provides for the harmonization of practices that affect fiscal
incentives to industry and for the harmonization of laws that affect
the operation of the Common Market. Despite the commanding
strides accomplished by tightening the operational structure, two
weaknesses exist in the new Caribbean Community and Common
Market Treaty. Since intra-West Indian trade is very low and there
is no evidence indicating that barriers to agricultural trade were
stifling,60 it is unclear why the bulk of the Treaty is still devoted
to outlining measures that remove barriers to agricultural trade.
A more suitable route would have been to emphasize plans for
allocating specific industries to the Less Developed Countries to
enhance their agricultural and industrial production and thereby
increase intra-West Indian trade. Lastly, it seems that the objectives and goals of the Common Market could be better effectuated
if the administrative framework were constructed in a different
manner. The administrative and policy-making organs-the Conference and the Common Market Council-are charged with the
responsibility of determining the policy of the Community and
Common Market and with the general operation of the Common
Market. They should be composed, at least in part, of technocrats
in addition to political Heads of Government. Adding persons with
technological and industrial expertise to the Conference and Council would probably assure a more economic, rather than political,
basis for its judgments affecting the operation and, ultimately, the
59. One of the major drawbacks of the earlier attempts at regional cooperation
was that despite internal concessions made to the participating Less Developed
Countries, the more developed Caribbean countries were the major beneficiaries
of the free trade plans and regional cooperation schemes, while the less developed
Caribbean countries reaped only minimal benefits. See, A Storm Shakes Caribbean Economic Cooperation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
60. For an excellent discussion of agricultural trade and economic integration
in the Caribbean see Brewster, CaribbeanEconomic Integration-Problemsand
Perspectives, 9 J. COMMON MARKET STUDIES 282 (1971).
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success of the Common Market. Despite these weaknesses in the
Treaty, the effectiveness and success of the new plan for economic
integration will depend largely on the good faith and good will of
Member States in adhering to the provisions and objectives of the
Treaty. The Caribbean Member States have constructed a wellorganized package of economic devices and techniques which appear well-suited to promote economic development and to
strengthen the political bonds of the region by creating a viable
economic community of Caribbean Commonwealth countries.
Annette Adams
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PANAMA CANAL TREATY-STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES PROVIDES GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATION OF NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATY
IN COMPLETE ABROGATION OF 1903 TREATY AS AMENDED-JOINT
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF
STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND HIS EXCELLENCY JUAN
ANTONIO TACK, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF

PANAMA, ON FEBRUARY 7, 1974

Almost since its inception, the Treaty of 1903 between the
United States and Panama,' governing the administration of the
Panama Canal, has been a source of friction between the two countries. The treaty has unquestionably resulted in great benefits to
both the United States and Panama; 2 nevertheless Panama has
been displeased with its terms and has fought for its abrogation.
Panamanians have long felt that the original treaty is weighted
heavily in favor of the United States, reflecting the fact that the
most powerful nation in the Western Hemisphere was bargaining
with an impoverished, defenseless country. 3 For Panama, the most
irksome provision in the treaty is one that gives the United States
1. Convention with Panama for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect
the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 Stat. 2234 (190305), T.S. No. 431 (effective Feb. 26, 1904) [hereinafter cited as "Canal Convention"].
2. Since its opening in 1914, the canal has provided benefits to the United
States, to Panama and to the world without any increase in toll rates. Some 70%
of the tonnage passing through the canal in recent years has either originated in,
or been destined for, the United States. This represents approximately 16% of all
United States import and export tonnage. As for Panama, more than 40% of its
foreign exchange earnings and one-third of its gross national product are directly
or indirectly attributable to the canal. Dep't of State Release No. 42 (Feb. 7,
1974).
3. In late 1902, the United States agreed to purchase the assets of the French
canal company that had previously unsuccessfully attempted to complete a canal
across the Isthmus of Panama. This agreement, however, was nullified on August
12, 1903, when Colombia, seeking greater concessions, rejected the United States'
proposal for a canal-building treaty. This action stirred the people of Panama into
open revolution against Colombia, a revolution supported wholeheartedly by the
United States. Interestingly enough, the United States attempted to justify its
actions under article 35 of the treaty with Colombia. Treaty with New Granada
on Peace, Amity, Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 12, 1846, 9 Stat. 881 (1845-51),
T.S. No. 54. It claimed that the right of transit across the isthmus that had
previously been granted to the United States gave it the right to build a canal,
in furtherance of world interest.
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complete jurisdiction in perpetuity over the ten-mile wide canal
zone and the power of eminent domain over land outside the zone.'
In addition, the original treaty granted the United States a right
to maintain order in two major Panamanian cities-Panama and
Col6n-"in case the Republic of Panama should not be, in the
judgment of the United States," able to do so.' Panama was even
required to add an article to its Constitution authorizing the
United States to intervene in any part of its territory to quell a
disturbance of public peace.' Panamanian discontent caused the
United States, both in 19367 and 1955,8 to agree to tredty amendments favorable to Panama's interests;9 nevertheless the original
treaty still forms the cornerstone of the relationship between the
two countries. During the past decade, particularly since the Janu-

Largely because of support of the United States, the Republic of Panama became an independent country. Almost immediately, Panama was thrust into
treaty negotiations with its chief supporter and benefactor, the United States.
Panama's position was further worsened by the fact that its ambassador to the
treaty negotiations was Phillippe Buna-Varilla, the head of the old French canal
company, who admitted quite openly that his major concern was protecting
French rather than Panamanian interests. It was under these circumstances that
Panama signed the Canal Convention.
4. Canal Convention, art. 2.
5. Canal Convention, art. 7.
6.

PAN.

CONST. art. 136 (1904).

7. Under the 1936 revision, in lieu of the United States unilateral guarantee
of Panamanian independence, the two countries agreed to "take such measures
of prevention and defense as they may consider necessary for the protection of
their common interest." In addition, the United States raised its annual payments to Panama from $250,000 to $430,000 per year, and agreed to prohibit all
American commercial enterprise within the Zone except that directly concerned
with shipping. Treaty with Panama on Friendship and Cooperation, Mar. 2, 1936,
53 Stat. 1807 (1939), T.S. No. 945. See generally Hunt, The Panama Canal
Treaties: Past, Present, Future, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 398, 407 (1965).
8. The three most significant provisions of this treaty revision are as follows:
(1) the increase in the annual gratuity of the United States from $430,000 to
$1,930,000; (2) the abandonment by the United States of some $24,000,000 worth
of real estate and buildings no longer needed for Zone administration; (3) the
equalization of pay and advancement opportunities within the Zone for American
and Panamanian employees. Treaty with Panama on Mutual Understanding and
Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, [1955] 2 U.S.T 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297. See generally
Fenwick, The Treaty of 1955 Between the United States and Panama, 49 AM. J.
INT'L L. 543 (1955).
9. For a chronicle of the 1936 and 1955 treaties and other minor American
concessions, see Hunt, supra note 7.
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ary riots of 1964, ' ° numerous unsuccessful attempts have been
made to draft a new treaty, which would deal more equitably with
Panamanian interests in the Canal Zone." In September 1973,
Ambassador-at-Large Ellsworth Bunker was dispatched by Secretary of State Kissinger to renew discussions with Panamanian officials for the purpose of developing an agreement in principle for
future treaty negotiations. Ambassador Bunker met with Panamanian Foreign Minister Tack from November 26 to December 3,
1973, and again on January 6.and 7, 1974, to discuss general principles upon which a new treaty might be based.' 2 These discussions
culminated in a Statement of Principles, signed on February 7,
1974. While the principles agreed upon are general in nature and
the specific provisions of the proposed treaty remain to be formulated, they are to serve as guidelines for future talks. By adopting
these principles, the United States and Panama have agreed that
the 1903 treaty should be replaced by a modern treaty that rejects
the concept of perpetuity and gives Panama both increased administrative powers over and financial benefits from the Panama
Canal. Joint Statement of the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and His Excellency
Juan Antonio Tack, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
10. A 1963 agreement had included the provision that wherever the American
flag would be flown in the Zone, it would always be accompanied by the Panamanian flag. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1963). Despite the accord, some American
high school students of the Zone, upon returning from their 1963 Christmas vacation, raised an American flag outside their school. When angry Panamanians
attempted to raise their flag alongside the American flag, they were unduly prohibited from so doing. The lives of four Americans and twenty Panamanians were
claimed in the rioting that ensued. See Hoyt, Law and Politics in the Revision of
Treaties Affecting the Panama Canal, 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 289 (1964-66).
11. Following discussion of the January riots in the Organization of American
States, United Nations, and other international agencies, the United States and
Panama agreed to begin bilateral negotiations in 1964. By 1967, negotiators from
the two countries had prepared three draft treaties, which provided, to a greater
extent, for the operation of the Canal as a joint venture. Neither country ratified
these treaties, and the new Panamanian Government, which assumed power in
October 1968, formally rejected them. Renewal of the negotiations was agreed
upon in 1970, and a Panamanian negotiating team arrived in Washington in June
1971. Though these talks produced a treaty offer from the United States, no action
was taken on this proposed treaty. Informal talks in March 1972, an exchange of
correspondence in the fall, and full-blown negotiations in Panama in December
1972, all proved fruitless. Dep't of State Release No. 42 (Feb. 7, 1974).
12. Id. at 1.
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Panama, on February 7, 1974, at Panama City, 70 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 184 (1974).1 "1
Pursuant to the following accepted principles, the United States
and Panama will attempt to negotiate a new canal treaty in complete abrogation of the 1903 treaty as amended. 4 The new treaty
will have a fixed termination date 5 and provide for a gradual increase in Panamanian participation in the operation and defense
of the canal. " Provision will also be made to increase Panama's
financial benefits from the canal, in recognition of the fact that the
waterway constitutes that country's primary resource. 7 To insure
that the canal remains adequate to handle future international
maritime traffic, the United States and Panama "shall agree bilaterally on provisions for new projects which will enlarge canal capacity."' 8 Most importantly, the Canal Zone itself will be returned
to the jurisdiction of Panama. As territorial sovereign, Panama
shall grant to the United States (for the duration of the new treaty)
whatever property rights are necessary for the "operation, maintenance, protection and defense of the canal . . .,,,
These principles should serve as the starting point for creating
a modern relationship between Panama and the United States. In
the talks that will soon begin, the United States has assured Panama that its major purpose will be to "restore Panama's territorial
sovereignty while preserving the interests of the United States and
its participation in what is . . . an indispensable international
13. Hereinafter cited as Joint Statement.
14. Joint Statement, art. 1.
15. Joint Statement, art. 2. The United States has proposed that change come
over a gradual period of time, perhaps 30 years, but Panama wants possession
much sooner. What U.S. Will Yield in New Deal for Panama, 76 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., No. 7 at 64 (Feb. 18, 1974) [hereinafter cited as U.S. NEWS].
16. Joint Statement, art. 6.
17. Joint Statement, art. 5. The United States has proposed that the present
annual payment of slightly under $2,000,000 be replaced by a royalty based on
tonnage, which would yield Panama about $25,000,000 per year at current traffic
rates. Dep't of State Release No. 42 (Feb. 7, 1974).
18. Joint Statement, art. 8.
19. Joint Statement, art. 4. The 533 square miles of the American-controlled
Canal Zone cut Panama into two parts. Panamanians must obtain American
permission to cross the Zone from one side of their country to the other. Although
this is not difficult, the restriction is resented. Also, Panamanians arrested in the
Zone are taken by American police to an American jail and then tried before an
American court. U.S. NEWS.
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waterway." 2 Perhaps to dramatize this country's good faith in
entering the agreement, President Nixon took the unusual step of
sending Secretary Kissinger to Panama solely to sign a set of principles that had already been agreed upon. It should be noted,
however, that while the two countries have reached an agreement
in principle, many of the major issues involved remain unresolved,
despite years of intense negotiation. For example, while both countries agree that Panama should gradually assume jurisdiction over
the Canal Zone, with the United States retaining only those lands
necessary to operate and defend the canal, there is still great disagreement over the timetable. In addition, the amount of land that
the United States should need for its operations, and the amount
it should pay for the privilege of its occupation remain unsettled. 2'
Furthermore, this Statement of Principles is not the first document of its kind; more than eight years ago, on September 24, 1965,
President Johnson of the United States and President Robles of
Panama signed an agreement that contained most of the same
general provisions.22 Subsequent attempts to convert this general
agreement into a specific treaty ended in failure.23 The United
States insists that the new statement, unlike its predecessor, will
eventually result in a treaty. In answer to those skeptical of the
1974 agreement, Secretary Kissinger has repeatedly stressed that
20.

U.S.

NEws.

21. Id.
22. President Reports on Progress of Treaty Negotiations with Panama, 53
DEP'T STATE BULL. 624 (1965). This document cited five areas of agreement that
had allegedly been reached: "1. The 1903 Treaty will be abrogated. 2. The new
treaty will effectively recognize Panama's sovereignty over the area of the present
Canal Zone. 3. The new treaty will terminate after a specified number of years
or on or about the date of the opening of the sea-level canal, whichever occurs
first. 4. A primary objective of the new treaty will be to provide for an appropriate
political, economic, and social integration of the area used in the canal operation
with the rest of the Republic of Panama. Both countries recognize that there is a
need for an orderly transition to avoid abrupt and possibly harmful dislocations. . . . 5. Both countries recognize the important responsibility they have to
be fair and helpful to the employees of all nationalities who are serving so efficiently and well in the operation of this very important canal. Appropriate arrangements will be made to insure that the rights and interests of these employees
are safe-guarded." Id. at 624-25.
The 1965 statement also made provision for future canal expansion and American defense of the canal.
23. See Joint Statement, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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its significance lies less in its specific answers to specific problems
than in its indication of a change in United States foreign policy.
The old policy favored applying power; the new policy stresses
"partnership" and "shared aspirations." ' If, indeed, a change in
United States policy toward Latin America has occurred, the new
policy will be vigorously tested in the months and years to come.
In the light of our past history and the difficult problems that
remain unsolved, it would seem that a great deal of time, effort,
and "partnership" will be required before any new relationship
between the United States and Panama is finally created.
Alan D. Mazer

24. Address by Secretary Kissinger, Signing of the Joint Statement of Principles for Negotiations on a New Panama Canal Treaty, Feb. 7, 1974, in 70 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 181 (1974). Citing the negotiations with Panama and the settlement
of a five-year dispute with Peru over compensation for the nationalized properties
of United States companies as examples of changed American policy, Secretary
Kissinger emphasized that America will no longer force "made in U.S." programs
upon its neighbors. Kissinger "Good Neighbor" Plan, 76 U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., No. 9, at 31 (Mar. 4, 1974).
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